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Abstract 
The key to achieve organizational success has been subject of much discussion throughout 
the years. Many theories tried to explain it, from the industrial organization model to the 
resource-based view. Still, there was a gap regarding how companies succeeded in dynamic 
markets. The dynamic capabilities view appeared in response to this breach, arguing that a 
firm could outperform others if it had a stronger market adaptation’s ability.  The present 
dissertation intends to illustrate this view by using a real business case, pointing out how 
adaptation to market changes can influence a company’s performance. At a first stage, the 
case shows the negative impact of not being attentive to changes, and in a second period 
shows performance improvement by the strengthening of dynamic capabilities. When 
writing this thesis, I attempted to provide responses to the following questions: What 
dimensions can lead a strong company to fail? What factors are crucial in a turnaround? 
How do strategic decisions translate into changes in the resource base? The main findings of 
the case suggest that the dimensions that form dynamic capabilities are crucial to explain 
both failure and rebound, depending on the extent by which a given firm exhibits such 
dimensions in each relevant period. These dimensions can be interrelated, meaning that the 
lack of one, can affect another. In addition, it shows that dynamic capabilities are not a 
dichotomous issue (i.e., it is not a matter of having or not, it is rather a question of degree). 
Furthermore, while having dynamic capabilities can help a company to achieve success, the 
case suggests that, to achieve this potential, all dimensions included in the dynamic 
capabilities concept are important. 
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 1 
I. Introduction 
The dynamic capabilities view appeared as an attempt to explain the success of some 
companies over others. This had been the object of theoretical focus for many decades, but 
so far there had been no satisfactory answers for dynamic environments.  
One early explanation was Porter’s Industrial Organization approach (1980). It put emphasis 
on the industry environment rather than on the company. Later on, the resource-based view 
came to build upon it, focusing instead on the firm’s assets and capabilities as the 
determinants of success. However, these theories were insufficient to address organizational 
success in dynamic environments.  
The dynamic capability view emerged from this gap (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) and it 
was based on the combinations of firm specific capabilities and resources when facing 
changing environments. One recent definition (Barreto, 2010) proposed dynamic capabilities 
as a potential to solve problems in a systematic way, meaning that there are other 
alternatives such as ad hoc problem solving or simply luck. According to this definition, 
dynamic capabilities are formed by four independent dimensions: propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, propensity to make timely decisions, propensity to make market-
oriented decisions, and propensity to change its resource base. 
Considering present times, and given the global economy reality, it is quite relevant to 
devote our attention to the dynamic capabilities concept. The firms’ exposure to 
multinational markets, undergoing fast and systematic changes throughout a very wide and 
dispersed geographical reach, creates the need for them to embrace this view (Teece, 2007). 
High velocity environments, by nature, are linked with a more frequent occurrence of 
change and the average period that a firm is able to sustain its competitive advantage is 
shown to be decreasing over time, which therefore leads to a need for achieving successive 
competitive advantages (Barreto, 2010; D’Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
The fact that this concept can be helpful at a multidisciplinary level makes it even more 
important to pursue.  The framework is able to integrate numerous research fields such as 
strategic management, law, economics, and innovation, among several others (Teece 2007).  
Many scholars have dedicated their time and energy to the development of the dynamic 
capabilities view and this phenomenon has been increasing over time, as it is observable by 
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doing a simple research in the ABI/INFORM database. Not only the research has expanded, it 
has also been gaining credibility by being published in top management journals and been 
awarded well-known prizes, such as in the cases of Winter (2003); Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000); Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), which all received The Dan and Mary Lou Schendel 
Best Paper Award, from the Strategic Management Society in recent years. 
How to respond efficiently and effectively to change has always been a constant question 
(D’Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). A company that went through a recent search 
for this answer was Starbucks. This firm is a US-based specialty coffee retailer that had been 
thriving in its industry for 40 years now, being the undisputed market leader. It is present in 
the Most Admired Companies list, as well as in the Fortune 500 since 2003.  
Around 2006, Starbucks’ performance started decreasing. What issues led such a strong 
company to fail? What factors were crucial to the subsequent turnaround? How did strategic 
decisions translate into changes in the resource base?  
This paper aims to focus on the dimensions underlying the dynamic capabilities’ concept, 
and apply them to the Starbucks case. The present dissertation will try to answer the above-
mentioned questions in five main sections. There will be a literature review in order to 
summarize the main findings in the dynamic capabilities field. In the second section, I will 
present the teaching case of Starbucks. In the subsequent section, I present the teaching 
note relative to the case. Afterwards, I include a Discussion section, highlighting the main 
contributions and limitations, and finally the conclusion, summarising the findings. 
This dissertation will hopefully allow a better understanding of the role of the dynamic 
capabilities view and its dimensions on a very strong company, such as Starbucks. It intends 
to prove the practical relevance of that view for companies who struggle with success when 
facing a changing market. 
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II. Literature Review 
The dynamic capabilities view has been evolving since its first appearance (Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997), having captured much attention since then, which has eventually led to some 
dispersion in the field. In consequence, there was a need for conceptualization integrating 
the key elements of this dispersed, past research, enabling the evolution of the field. 
Taking a step back in time, it is very important to understand the origins of this concept. The 
dynamic capabilities’ view is the most recent attempt to explain the success of a firm over 
others, but there had been other attempts before. Michael Porter (1980) tried to solve this 
mystery with his industrial organisation model, stating that the company performance would 
depend mostly on the sector. It was a breakthrough in management and still today this 
theory is widely used to evaluate a company’s environment.  
The resource-based view (RBV) appeared to overcome the industry focused perspective, by 
introducing the importance of firm’s core competences. It put emphasis on the internal 
factors as determinants of success, rather than on the external setting. However, it is a static 
approach, overlooking changing environments (Priem and Butler, 2001).  
The dynamic capabilities view was developed considering dynamic markets and its impact on 
organizational success. In its founding work, dynamic capability was described as an “ability 
to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). This definition had significant 
limitations, given that it was somehow tautological. Nevertheless, it addressed the search 
for an outstanding performance in a dynamic market, opening the door to this unexplored 
field.  
Later, one paper expressed dynamic capabilities as “processes that use resources” 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), and also considered that the market would have an influence 
on the configuration of those resources. Zollo and Winter (2002) suggested dynamic 
capabilities as routines; they defined dynamic capabilities as a “learned and stable pattern of 
collective activity”. Adding to this, they felt the need to add a purpose - “improved 
effectiveness”. Later on, Winter (2003) divided capabilities in two levels. The higher order 
capabilities would influence the ordinary ones, which in turn allowed short-term survival. 
The resource base notion appeared with Helfat et al. work (2007), where the organization’s 
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capacity of adaptation to a change in the market involved also adjusting the resource base. 
Another relevant innovation to the dynamic capabilities view emerged with Teece (2007), 
when he expressed it as being a compound of elements. Nonetheless, so far, it was not 
possible to test the validity of any definition, and therefore they were seen as tautological 
(Williamson, 1999) and vague (Kraatz and Zajac, 2001).  
Barreto (2010) was the author who was able to put forward a definition condensing the 
previous research, reaching a solid definition and providing guidelines for the future. This 
latest view defined dynamic capabilities as a multidimensional construct of four variables, 
which allowed testing. The dimensions, “propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to 
make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base”, are not 
necessarily related, making it important to look at the variance and covariance that are both 
common for the construct and specific for each of them. These dimensions emerged as a 
consolidation of what had been mentioned by other authors in the past. The propensity to 
sense opportunities and threats was present in Teece’s work (2007) under the terms 
“capacity to sense and shape opportunities and threats” and it also refers to the monitoring 
of the capabilities (Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl, 2007). The knowledge a company acquires 
over time, which consequently leads to the formation of routines, can be determinant when 
facing an exogenous shock. 
Making timely decisions had already been mentioned briefly by Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2002), under the concept of doing it “sooner”. Anticipation can provide a firm with the first 
mover advantage, which usually translates into a stronger position regarding competition. 
Concerning the market oriented aspect, it was highlighted by Adner and Helfat (2003), when 
they referred that the “content” of a decision was also crucial. Adapting to market trends 
and needs, and therefore offering high value to customers is decisive for a firm to be 
competitive. “Using real time information, cross functional relationships and intensive 
communication” (Eisenhardt and Marting, 2000), provided by effective routines, is 
important towards making wise decisions. 
The last element of the definition, the change in the “resource base”, was introduced by 
Helfat et al. (2007) and revived by Barreto (2010). It is crucial, not only to make the right 
decisions, at the right moment, but also to reconfigure resources according to those 
strategic choices. 
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This dynamic capabilities definition was presented as a “potential to systematically solve 
problems”, which tells the reader it is not the only answer or even the right one, it is one  
option among others, such as “ad-hoc problem solving” (Winter, 2003) and “luck” (Barney, 
1986). Furthermore, “potential” avoids a dichotomous judgement, dynamic capabilities are 
not a black and white definition, it can be used at different levels, which is somewhat in line 
with what Winter (2003) stated. 
In addition, by being a possible way of solving a problem, it implies the need to be exercised 
at a given moment, it is a choice. Moreover, it suggests a persistent character, since to 
achieve a systematic approach, it needs to be trained and consistently evoked. It’s not 
automated, but rather a learned pattern.  
The heterogeneity has been a much discussed topic within the dynamic capabilities scope. In 
the first work ever published on the topic (Teece et al., 1997) the assumption was that each 
firm had its unique set of dynamic capabilities.  It was a natural derivative from the existing 
VRIN criteria, part of the RBV theory. According to it, resources that provide sustainable 
competitive advantage would need to be valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable. 
However it was not always the case of dynamic capabilities, at least not for Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000), who supported that best practices were widely adopted by businesses in 
order to improve performance. Nonetheless the paper suggested that some details of each 
company were idiosyncratic, which meant that, as a whole, each firm was unique. Barreto 
(2010) came to support this view, there can be commonalities in some of the dimensions, 
while others are differentiated, and therefore dynamic capabilities are singular in details. 
The dynamic capabilities’ effect on a firm’s performance has also been an area of 
divergence, having three different paths been proposed through time. The first was a direct 
link between dynamic capabilities and performance, which was presented in the primordial 
paper (Teece et al., 1997), but it did not hold due to the phrasing of the definition. This 
article defined a capability as an “ability”, this way not clarifying the concept, just stating it in 
a slightly different form. In the second proposal, dynamic capabilities were not necessarily 
linked with success, it would depend on the resulting resource base and management 
decisions. The conclusion was that these capabilities were necessary, but not sufficient to 
succeed (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007). Nonetheless, dynamic capabilities 
may not be the solution for all the problems that emerge in a firm, as Winter (2003) stated, 
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sometimes it might be too costly to implement a system that enabled the creation of such 
capabilities, alternatively suggesting ad-hoc problem solving. The last approach connected 
dynamic capabilities to performance through an indirect link (Zott, 2003). It was not yet clear 
how this relationship was defined, but future research on the field was alerted not to 
propose an association over these two factors, since the definition of dynamic capabilities 
tried to analyze that relation trough the dimensions’ study (Barreto, 2010).  
To understand when dynamic capabilities are profitable to implement, there are two factors 
that must be carefully examined: the industry and the size of the company. Since the origin 
of the view, dynamic capabilities seemed to be more useful in high velocity markets 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), since in these cases the need for an efficient adaptation was 
much greater. In addition, the capabilities need to be flexible, creating grounds for a better 
and faster reaction to changes, this way adding more value. On the other hand, Zahra, 
Sapienza, and Davidsson (2006) defended that dynamic capabilities would also be useful in 
stable and more predictable environments, relying on knowledge the company has acquired 
through time, which led to the creation of routines. Barreto (2010) presented in his paper 
that there is still a long road ahead, more research should be done regarding the 
competitive environment where dynamic capabilities would add more value. 
The relevance of the firm’s size is not well defined yet, some authors have stated that it was 
more beneficial for larger, multinational companies to own dynamic capabilities (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002) due to the advantage of scale on the implementing of learning mechanisms; 
other authirs suggested any company would gain by adopting this view (Døving and 
Gooderham, 2008). There is still the need to deepen the analysis and find a consensus 
regarding this variable. 
Going back to the quest for a firm’s key to success, it’s essential to understand how dynamic 
capabilities can contribute to it. As we live in a changing environment rather than in a static 
one, adaptation is vital. The idea of maintaining a sustainable competitive advantage 
indefinitely is not very realistic. The goal is then to achieve successive competitive 
advantages, facing the various changes in the markets, which can be leveraged on the 
existence of dynamic capabilities (D’aveni, 1994, Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). However, 
there is no guarantee that there will be a positive return from implementing dynamic 
capabilities. It will depend on other variables such as how the resource base will turn out or 
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management decisions. Managers don’t always understand the benefits, it is not clear for 
them that the advantages can overcome the investment. It requires a long-term 
commitment to put in place such a view, but in the end it is expectable that “on average, 
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III. Teaching Case 
Starbucks – The Growth Trap 
When Starbucks opened its doors in 1971 in Seattle as a local and humble coffee shop, no 
one could imagine the growth this organization would have. Howard D. Schultz was the one 
who, back in 1987, bought Starbucks with a dream: he wanted to bring quality coffee into 
the American market. Since then, Starbucks went from a small chain of 6 stores into a giant 
owning 17,000 shops.  
Starbucks made a difference through its unique identity, focusing its energies on providing a 
distinctive coffee tasting experience. In 2000, Schultz stepped out of his CEO position, 
leaving its successful 3,501 stores company in Orin C. Smith’s hands and later in Jim 
Donald’s. Eight years later, Starbucks was failing, and Schultz was forced to return to put the 
organization back on track. Stock price had dropped from $39 in November 2006 to $19 in 
2008.  
By 2011, after numerous changes, Starbucks was back on its feet, and a proud, yet humble 
Schultz was reminded of “how fleeting success and wining can be”1. What had happened 
along the way? Why wasn’t Starbucks able to maintain its performance? How did Schultz’s 
decisions help Starbucks? 
 
Starbucks unknown early years 
The name that first comes to our minds when speaking of Starbucks is the one from of 
current CEO, Howard D. Schultz. However Starbucks’ was founded in Seattle by Jerry 
Baldwin, Zev Ziegler and Gordon Bowker in 1971 to offer what coffee lovers wanted: drink 
high quality coffee2.  
Howard D. Schultz, living in America at the time, had quite a normal life as a modest Jewish 
New Yorker. After getting his degree at the Northern Michigan University in 1975, and 
working through several jobs, he became general manager of a coffee maker manufacturer, 
Hammarplast. In 1981, as a part of his job, he went to Seattle to a visit a local store that had 
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been buying its coffee makers in higher quantities than the other clients, and in 1982 he 
ended up joining that coffee shop - Starbucks.   
On a business trip to Milan, Italy, he found a very different coffee market, where there were 
small stores in every corner, the coffee had high quality and they were seen as social hubs3. 
In that moment he had a vision: to bring that European concept to the American market. He 
then returned to Seattle with his mind set-up to acquire Starbucks and take his new concept 
to North America. This was 1987, the American coffee culture was very undeveloped, from 
the 1960s to mid 1980s coffee sales had been declining, but premium coffee demand was 
increasing4. At the time he had to pay $3.8 million for the acquisition of the six retail stores 
and a roasting plant.  
The new CEO’s vision was to create a “third place”5, providing high quality, customized 
coffee drinks, through a team of specialized baristas, who maintained a personal relationship 
with customers. Knowing clients by name and anticipating the order was the ultimate goal 
for the employees6. It was all about the experience and culture, and that made them into a 
premium coffee brand that people were willing to pay for. Schultz focused much on the 
community factor, he stated, “I tried to build a company my father would have been proud 
to work for, that he would have looked back on and said, ‘That’s the company that honoured 
me, even though I don’t have an education’. I wanted to build a company that had a 
conscience”, and it was more than just words, he brought it to life. It eventually became a 
culture that was unique to this company. 
All aspects of the supply chain were tightly controlled. Schultz made sure that his high 
quality standards were guaranteed right from the coffee beans suppliers to the person 
serving the coffee. “It is how we buy coffee that makes Starbucks special” said Dub Hay, one 
of the company executives, denoting how important the beans’ quality was. Employees, also 
known as “partners”, were respected and rewarded highly above the market. They had 
privileges such as healthcare and stock options, creating a situation where the success of the 
company impacted directly on their wealth. For Schultz, hiring and training the best people 
was “the best way to meet and exceed the expectations of customers”7. 
Starbucks was committed to be a responsible corporate citizen, showing concern about 
customers, employees and the coffee growing community. For Starbucks, the overall goal 
was to be seen as a “company that cares”8.  
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The retailer devoted a special attention to consumer preferences. Baristas were always on 
the watch for client’s repeated requests or behind-the-counter preparation. Many of the 
new offerings came to life through this process. Furthermore, in order to ensure a 
consistency of the drinks’ taste, there were standardized procedures that employees had to 
strictly follow. 
The value proposition Starbucks brought to the coffee market was a combination of quality 
products, enhanced customer service and a distinctive atmosphere9. Ultimately, Starbucks 
came to change the coffee culture, transform the way coffee was drank, raise the willingness 
to pay, and become the company Americans thought of when talking about coffee10. 
Customers were actually willing to pay as much as $3.50 for a single drink - a blast of 
premium coffee11. 
 
Becoming a giant 
America was the place where the modern chain store was created with the Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Company’s opening in 1859. There was a major adoption of the concept, and by 
the early 1950s chains accounted already for 23% of the total retail volume. When Starbucks 
entered in the specialty coffee market, big chains were still flourishing.  
Howard Schultz decided to enter into this market in 1987, and for that, the first step he took 
towards expansion was to surround himself with people who had the right expertise. 
Howard Behar, the President of Thousand Trails Inc, an outdoor resorts developer, was hired 
in 1989 and being a retail veteran he was the one who put emphasis on consumer service12. 
The CEO also searched for other executives who had experience in the food industry, to aid 
him building a strategy that would allow the growth he wanted13. 
Starbucks enjoyed a favourable consumer trend towards specialty food, supported by the 
increasing income per capita and by some popular TV shows (for instance “Friends” 
launched a tendency of hanging-out in coffee shops). The market was developing very 
rapidly, from 585 coffee retailers in 1989, the number increased to 12,000 in 199914.   
During the early presence of Howard Schultz as CEO, the company grew from the six Seattle 
based stores to 3,501, mainly concentrated in North America, but also with presence in 18 
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other geographies (Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2) in 2000. The Asia-Pacific region was one of the 
targets due to its massive concentration of population and there was also some interest in 
Europe, as revealed by the entrance in the U.K., the safest doorway due to country 
similarities. 
The strategy used to expand in North America was to create clusters, which translated into 
opening stores so close to each other that no other competitor would dare to enter. This 
method of penetration would lead to cannibalization between shops, but it seemed to be 
worth it15.  Schulz also established many alliances, which enabled him to reach more 
locations, namely airports, retail stores and supermarkets, and increase the variety of 
products Starbucks was offering, such as the Frappuccino.  
Starbucks evolution until 2000 was a success, its stock price raised to $44.25, comparing to 
its 1992’s IPO price of $17 a share. People adhered to the concept and it became part of 
their routine. Starbucks was not only selling coffee, but a whole set of experiences. 
Apparently Starbucks was successful in delivering value to customers, as the average 
customer visited Starbucks’ locations 18 times a month and spent $3.50 each time16, making 
it the most visited retailer in the country17. By this time, the net revenue was $2.2 billion, 
enabling a 9.7% operating margin (Exhibit 3). Meanwhile, Schultz stepped out of his role to 
become chairman and chief strategist.  
From 2001 to 2005, now under the command of Orin Smith, a Starbucks manager since 
1990, the firm achieved a revenue of $6.4 billion, after opening additional 6,740 stores, 
which led to a total of 10,241 locations (Exhibit 4). During Smith’s mandate, new features 
were added to Starbucks in order to create newness, enhancing the atmosphere and 
providing a better experience to customers. The most significant introduction was the 
prepaid card, in November 2001, which allowed Starbucks to spot its best clients, while 
simplifying transactions and attracting new customers18. Surveys were pointing to the 
conclusion that having the card would lead clientele to come to Starbucks twice as much as 
non-cardholders. The company also made an important acquisition in 2003, Seattle’s Best 
Coffee, which was a significant premium competitor. According to Howard Schultz, the 
Chairman at that time, the new asset provided an opportunity to launch the next phase of 
their specialty coffee growth.  
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The coffee market was expanding, having experienced a 157% growth between 2000 
($3,258m) and 2005 ($8,372m), with premium coffee gaining a special relevance, but still 
independent shops were gaining market, 5% a year19. It was a very attractive business to be 
in, as Joe Pawlak, a consultant from Technomic said in the USA Today “Depending on how 
you price it, you can make 90% margins-plus.”20. The number of shops increased much - for 
instance, in one intersection in Seattle, Starbucks had stores in three of the four corners and 
was considering opening another on the fourth21. This company held such a strong position 
that even after the American tragedy of September 11th, Schultz was comfortable enough to 
say, "I think we've demonstrated that we are close to a recession-proof product". 
Jim Donald was the next in line to step up as CEO and stayed from 2005, a time when the 
stock was at $61.14 at the beginning of the year, until 2007 when shares were transacted at 
$20. He had quite a reputation for successful turnarounds along his career. An example of it 
was his presence in the Wal-Mart stores, where he expanded 6 locations into 146. His goal 
for Starbucks was to turn it into a 40,000 store chain worldwide and he took measures in 
order to achieve it. The company reached a six stores per day opening rate in 2006, having 
as strategy: increasing convenience.  
At this point some analysts doubted the sustainability of the company growth approach. 
Later in 2006 store sales started declining as well as stock price, which was $35.42 by the 
end of 2006. Still, by the time Donald left Starbucks, it had a revenue of $9,4 billion with 
14,895 stores (Exhibit 5). 
Tendencies had changed regarding the attachment to big multinational chains. Although 
worldwide 76% of the population preferred multinational chains, once they expanded the 
consumer choices, people were becoming aware of its negative impacts on the local culture. 
Regarding the US population, only 14% stated that big chains were better than small coffee 
houses22 (Exhibit 6).  
In 2005 there were already some indicators showing consumers were starting to become 
more interested in the local communities instead of global brands23. There was a trend 
towards buying locally, as confirmed by a study performed by Civic Economics, stating that 
locally owned businesses put approximately twice the money into the community than a 
chain retailer does24. Also, a crisis, like the subprime mortgage crisis in America, led people 
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to reconsider their values, giving more emphasis to what is “real” - friends, neighbours, 
family and their community – therefore fleeting the global giants toward a more familiar 
solution25. For the first time there was a counter-trend to globalization and it was 
embedding America and starting to spread.  Coffee consumers and even some cartoons 
were diminishing Starbucks image, proffering opinions such as: 
“I feel, especially in Chicago, our theory was the reason we weren't able to find a really good 
coffee shop there is because a Starbucks is on almost every corner. Starbucks is awful. There 
is even a Simpsons episode where Bart Simpson walks into the mall, and then you see a 
Starbucks and you see next door, "Coming Soon—Starbucks." Then he leaves and you see the 
whole mall from the inside, and it's wall-to-wall Starbucks. It's funny, but in a way it's true.”26 
Furthermore, drinking coffee in an inviting atmosphere was not appreciated as highly as 
expected, since only 14% of the American respondents thought it was a valuable feature, 
comparing to the 44% of the world average27.  
Trends in 2007 were anticipating issues in big chains, such as the one stated by The Trend 
Journal: “Major chains, from sporting goods to cups of coffee, whose business models are 
based on growing stores rather than increasing in-store sales, will decline in share value”28. 
Regarding the willingness to pay, 73% of the Americans thought that Starbucks coffee was 
overpriced in 2008. Only 6% of the respondents were defending that this retailer was 
providing good value for money29, especially considering that everyday’s rush made people 
grab their coffee in a quick in and out visit to the store. There was less value in offering an 
experience that customers didn’t had the time to enjoy30. Most of the sales in the Starbucks 
American stores were takeaway. However, convenience was an important driver of purchase 
and in that factor, Starbucks excelled. This driver accounted for 64.6% of the choice of where 
to drink coffee.  
Yet another change occurred in the American market: younger people were becoming more 
addicted to coffee. By 2008, the fourth year in a row increase, people among 18 to 24 years 
old were consuming more coffee, about 6% in that year alone31. This meant more people at 
those ages looking for fancy drinks and willing to pay for it. As Bruce Milletto, president of 
Bellissimo Coffee InfoGroup, stated in an interview "consumers are becoming more 
particular", their reasoning is "We want good coffee and we're willing to pay for it"32. On the 
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other hand, older people, who were the bigger parcel of the population, preferred to drink a 
plain, black coffee (Exhibit 7).  
 
Economy downturn 
The American market suffered a huge slowdown with the subprime mortgage crisis and this 
economical downturn achieved its high in 200833. By this time, Americans were very 
restricted regarding their discretionary budget, and very pessimistic also. Spending money in 
specialty goods was not a viable possibility, the essential expenditures were the priority and 
therefore all premium retailers saw their business threatened. In addition, gas prices also 
rose as well as some other basic goods, “pinching” consumers even more34.  
Starbucks was also affected by the economical decline, especially given that there were low 
cost chains betting on the coffee shop sector. McDonalds had just launched McCafés with 
success. Consumers were choosing McDonald’s espresso as better tasting over some 
premium brands, including Starbucks35. To make matters worse, these low cost coffee bars 
were planned to be implemented in 14,000 of the American McDonald’s stores, creating a 
new alternative for budget restricted consumers with a massive country reach (Exhibit 8). 
This low end retailer was pushing a change in consumer minds and consequently the coffee 
connotation was taking a step back, into a commodity again. Starbucks had managed to 
establish coffee as an experience and was now losing its edge36. Schultz, the chairman at the 
moment, admitted to have misread the economy, he confessed the company had 
underestimated the effect that the recession would have on consumer spending37. 
Adding to the above mentioned issues, Starbucks was no longer alone in the quality coffee 
business, as it was facing direct competition such as Caribou Coffee, Peet’s Coffee and Tea, 
Panera Bread, Dunkin’ Donuts, the Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf among others. All of them 
offered quality coffee, and even though their strategies differed (Exhibit 9), all of them were 
playing strong cards.  
Despite the fact that there was a difficult economic landscape, this did not seem to be the 
major cause for the firm’s issues. Starbucks was already decreasing its performance in 2006, 
two years before the Nasdaq index - market where the actions are transacted - and its 
comparable industry (Exhibit 10), and before the American population felt the budget 
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restriction (Exhibit 11). Moreover, according to the American National Coffee Association, 
specialty coffee demand was rising. Consumers had not stopped drinking specialty coffee. 
“People seem like they still need their coffee”, said the Euromonitor researcher Ty Law, they 
were just pickier on making choices. The reasoning for purchase seemed to be supported by 




The landscape around the globe differed much from the American reality. The hot drinks 
market had a huge potential. In 2007 the world market value was estimated to be $58.6 
billion, 54.7% of which was generated by coffee, and with a forecast to achieve $66.3 billion 
by 201239. American brands were thriving, big chains were appreciated at a much higher 
rate, the features valued differed from the American reality, the brands were viewed 
differently, and the preferences also diverged.  
Coffee had become an addiction throughout the world. In many locations, people simply 
couldn’t live without at least one coffee in the morning, which was the case of the majority 
of the Serbians, French, and Americans among others (Exhibit 12).  
Starbucks meant different things according to the place it was on40. To the Asian market, 
Starbucks was regarded as a social place for businessmen and several other consumers to 
meet and the transactions were mainly for indoor consumption. It was enjoying huge 
success, with Japan alone having a market value of $7,801 million in the ready to drink (RTD) 
market and a 74,5% share in global RTD market in 200841 (Exhibit 13). Still, Asia consumers 
were the least caffeine-lovers (Exhibit 14), with tea having an enormous relevance42, and 
accounting for 38.1% of the global hot drinks’ market in 200743. 
One big issue on international operations was the arrival of many copycats. Similar designs, 
name and logo were used all over the world in an attempt to build profitable local 
businesses. Starbucks was fighting to overcome this obstacle, and, in some cases, it even had 
to file suits, such as in China, against Shanghai Xingbake Café (Exhibit 15).  
Furthermore, Starbucks, as many other big chains, had to struggle with international local 
opinions44. There were several judgments against such a huge brand, with activists ranging 
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from farmers’ supporters, nutritionists, to anti US brands. 
 
Behind the Expansion 
The growth happened not only because the company was pushing it, but perhaps also due 
to a strong pressure from investors. Being a public organization since 1992, the financial 
performance was always under the attentive eyes of Wall Street, as Schultz mentioned in 
one of his interviews45. The company was evaluated on continued expansion, meaning that 
the attention was focused on how many stores opened each year and how the sales per 
stores evolved. In order to keep up with such a pressure, changes occurred in the company, 
some more visible than others.  
The amount of stores Starbucks owned in North America, together with the International 
growth, led to an overexpansion in a mature market46. Starbucks wasn’t capable of 
delivering the same quality service people were expecting. Baristas just needed to press the 
coffee-maker button and immediately they had a “soulless coffee”47. Furthermore, the 
coffee tasted burned, turning Starbucks into “Charbucks”48 as some dissatisfied customers 
called it. There was no longer the personal relationship with baristas, since the goal was to 
take the minimum time possible to serve a customer, so that the waiting line was small, and 
the frequency of transactions higher. Coffee machines were automated also to improve 
efficiency, and became much bigger in size, not allowing baristas to make eye contact with 
the client while preparing the beverage. There was also a standardization of the store 
design, as cited in the 2007 Memo from Howard Schultz: ”stores no longer have the soul of 
the past and reflect a chain of stores vs. the warm feeling of a neighbourhood store”. Even 
the most basic details were missing (e.g. cups where leaking)49. Starbucks was no longer 
unique and providing a cosy “third place” with high quality coffee.  
The firm’s focus on coffee seemed to have disappeared given the wide dispersion of 
products, and many of them were not even coffee-related (CDs, DVDs, books or teddy 
bears); other products jeopardized the aroma that characterized the stores50. For instance, 
between 2005 and 2006, there were 22 new beverages, the food menu contained a wide 
range of items from breakfast to desserts and the entertainment department was evolving 
with a plan to partner with iTunes providing a Starbucks area on Apple’s application. The 
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retailer justified the massive offer as an improvement to the experience provided, but it 
seemed more as a way to achieve a higher check per customer.  
The brand was also expanding to new distribution channels. At the time, Starbucks’ products 
could be found in groceries or retail outlets. They thought it was a mean to achieve more 
visibility.  
The international markets became more and more a company concern, it had proven to be a 
source of strong profitability (Exhibit 16), accounting for almost 30% of Starbucks 2008 
revenues. The entry strategy was tailored to match the conditions of the target location; 
they chose whether to enter through organic growth, joint venture, acquisitions or licensing. 
There was always some degree of local adaptation according to tastes and habits in order to 
get a balance between customization and consistency. For instance, China had a very 
different culture where people prefer tea. Drinking coffee was a social event and Starbucks 
needed to take this in account when implementing its operations (Exhibit 17). Also, Chinese 
people never drank their coffee without food, leading the company to increase the food 
offer. Overall, the drivers of a successful market penetration were the right choice of 
partnerships (Exhibit 18), the premium image and effort on meeting key consumer 
preferences51. Independently of the entry mode chosen, Starbucks desire was always to gain 
control over the stores. The goal seemed to be entering in as many locations as possible, and 
in the fastest way. Efforts were mainly focused on few countries with high potential, namely 
Brazil, India, China and Russia52. 
However, somewhere along the road Starbucks had lost its identity and even the founder of 
the concept was appealing for a return “to the core” (Exhibit 19). During the search for a 
strong growth, the company lost sight of what was really important, ultimately hurting their 
very own foundation. Growth became an addiction, but as Howard Schultz said “growth 
should not be – and is not - a strategy; it’s a tactic”53. 
 
Back to core 
The Organization 
By 2008, in response to the decreasing performance, Howard Schultz returned “home”, to 
his former CEO position. At his arrival the shares were transacted at $19.31. He was fully 
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energized and aware of what had happened to Starbucks along the way, bringing with him a 
handful of improvement suggestions. As he said, “we lost our way”, adjustments needed to 
be made, “we went back to start-up mode, hand-to-hand combat every day”.  
 
Taking a step back 
The chief executive officer had a strategy to pursue and it involved many adaptations, 
starting at cutting in the number of stores. Everything was put into question, as Starbucks 
needed to identify what had gone wrong.  
The first realization was that the massive growth they had been undertaking had become 
“carcinogen”. Schultz needed to cut costs, reorganize the company and rebuild the strategy, 
as he wanted to do “the right thing”54. 
The underperforming stores were closed and, interestingly, some of them had just opened. 
As Schultz said in an interview with McKinsey, the investment decisions “were made with a 
lack of discipline”, they were “kind of complicit with the stock price”. In order to avoid these 
poor assessments, the company stopped reporting the same-store sales, the business focus 
would, from this point on, be only on the customer. About 900 stores had closed across the 
globe by early 2009, employees were laid off and ultimately costs were cut by $580 million55. 
These were harsh times, cutting was the word of the day, and it was not the best image to 
pass to a community, but it had to be done in order to revive the company. The diversity of 
products was also revised, there was a re-focus on coffee and on what Schultz liked to call 
the “romance” around it. The company ''is committed to examining all aspects of our 
business that are not directly related to our core'', said the CEO.  
 
The team 
Schultz immediately reorganized the executives that surrounded him, and only two of the 
top 10 executives remained in the company. Some key executives had stepped out recently. 
For instance, Michael Casey, the CFO resigned his position in 2007, although remaining a 
firm’s advisor. He gave place to Peter Bocian who was seen as an added value due to, as 
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stated by Jim Donald, “his international finance experience and proven leadership skills as 
we continue our aggressive expansion overseas”.  
Cliff Burrows became the new president, after having occupied varied management 
positions with Habitat Designs Limited, a furniture and house wares retailer. He was hired to 
dedicate his time to customers’ preferences, according to the location, as he said “it's about 
consumers influenced by where they live''. 
The Chief Information Officer, Bryan Crynes, was let go by Schultz. He had been in that 
position since 2001, and allegedly there was too much bureaucracy getting in the way of an 
effective IT system dedicated to the customer experience56. Chris Bruzzo, the former Vice 
President of Digital Strategy and the recently appointed Chief Technology Officer filled this 
place. His functions included rethinking ways to connect with customers with the use of 
technology, such as loyalty initiatives.  
Arthur Rubinfield was one of the new acquisitions Schultz brought in, he was part of 
Starbucks until 2002, and had been crucial for brand development. At this point he entered 
as the President of Global Development, putting his efforts to the local adaptation. 
Not just executives were contemplated in Howard Schultz’s plan. Baristas also played a big 
role. In order to accomplish a so-called community, where employees knew customers by 
name, it was very important that they were skilled, the staff turnover rate was low, and the 
partners were satisfied.  
The first step was to get feedback, in order to improve employee’s satisfaction, and 
therefore decrease staff turnover. They were the face of the company, thus it was important 
they communicated the right message. There was an effort on education and training. This 
investment provided partners with knowledge, not only about the coffee history and 
espresso making, but also about how to deal with clients. As Howard announced though a 
videotaped message, “This is about the love and compassion and commitment that we all 
need to have for the customer”. The barista needed to be an artist in making coffee and also 
a person with good interpersonal skills57. The partners were also asked to discuss ideas to 
improve techniques, aiming to enhance the taste and texture of drinks, since they were the 
ones dealing both with customers and the coffee. Ultimately it was a quest for employee 
engagement. 
  Starbucks – The Growth Trap 
 20 
Understanding the market 
Howard Schultz quickly understood that he had to get insights about the market, find out 
who were the ones buying from him and what they searched for. Upon his arrival Starbucks 
performed customer research surveys and created a social network. The whole point was to 
get as much suggestions and feedback as possible in order to offer greater value to the right 
customers. The online community, mystarbucksidea.com, was intended to become an 
interactive forum connecting customers, partners and other stakeholders. It encouraged 
everyone to give opinions, and to comment other’s contributions, the most relevant ideas 
were revised to possible implementation and went to a separate blog “Ideas in Action”. 
Eventually some of the proposals even became part of Starbucks processes. An example of 
this was the elimination of receipts, when transactions were of very low value, which 
allowed reducing paper waste58.  
Another big step was the adaption of the retailer to the location it was inserted in. This 
adjustment included dimensions from the architectural and decoration sections, to the 
actual products offered. The inside store environment should reflect the local culture, using 
local art and furniture. It should also be adapted to the public that visited a given store. For 
instance, if the main customers were students and stayed in the store to study, there should 
be space dedicated to it. If the store had mainly takeaway customers, then the disposition 
should be quite different. The most extreme situation was the opening of a shop in Seattle, 
Starbucks’ birthplace, but under a different name: the shop was called “15th Ave. Coffee & 
Tea”. It was an attempt to create a deeper connection with the local community, showing 
how the company understood the importance of moving away from standardization. 
The offer in each place should be in line with the local preferences. For example, serving 
more cold drinks in Sun Belt, while Pacific Northwest preferred espresso, and Asia 
appreciated its tea. The beans would also match the tastes, adopting a more artisanal shop 
approach. 
The Prepaid Cards that had been introduced in 2001 were, in 2008, supplied with a new 
function, a reward program. By doing so, clients were able to customize their drinks for free. 
It was a clear incentive to build a deeper relation and even attract more heavy users. 
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Increasing Visibility  
Starbucks decided to bet on heavier advertisement, leaving behind the conservative method 
of only approaching a small target with a big impact. It’s not that they didn’t want to devote 
attention to word-of-mouth incitation events, but it was no longer their sole line of attack. 
They chose to promote this somewhat mainstream side to compete with the new entrant 
McDonalds, and so did other players in the market (Exhibit 20). The means used were TV 
campaigns or coupons in newspapers. It was a very high investment, about $100 million in 
2008, but it was a strong method to increase visibility59.  
Moreover, Starbucks planned to better communicate its social initiatives, and even intensify 
them. It was a way of diminishing criticisms by worldwide activists, and to reflect the effort 
put in the communities.  
Distribution channels were enlarged, in order to reach more people. As the CEO mentioned 
when giving an interview, he wanted to create a new advantage, the idea was to “build 
complementary channels of distribution by integrating the retail footprint and the 
ubiquitous channels of distribution – in our case, grocery stores and drug stores”. Not 
forgetting that more than 11% of the Americans bought flavoured coffee to consume at 
home, it was not a market that Starbucks wanted to miss out60. The retailer was seeking to 
push more own brand products, through a wide variety of cannels, considering also selling 
through hotels or restaurants61, to expand the offer of products and experiences to another 




Starbucks was in a big quest to regain its vitality. To do that, one of the most determinant 
decisions was about what customers to attack and how. Howard Schultz chose a peculiar 
path: to remain a premium brand, reviving it, while serving also the price-sensitive 
segment62. 
To recuperate the premium connotation Starbucks once had, the company needed to focus 
on the coffee, and the experience provided. Coffee had always been at the core of Starbucks 
  Starbucks – The Growth Trap 
 22 
success. It presented a quality that America hadn’t experienced until the company’s 
appearance, and it was what differentiated the retailer.  
The first measure towards the reinforcement of quality coffee was the adoption of a new 
espresso machine, Mastrena, instead of the present automatic one. It was smaller, allowing 
customers to see the barista and interact with him while making the drink; by being 
manually operated it allowed employees to practice their coffee-making technique, and 
finally it grinded coffee for each drink. The speed was not compromised, since the new 
machine could still guarantee the so required efficiency.  
The following big move was the acquisition of the Coffee Equipment Company in March 
2008, granting them the access to a machine with the capability of brewing one cup at a 
time, instead of a pot. The name of the high-end coffee maker was Clover and it allowed 
making a more expensive, yet higher quality drink. It enabled controlling the temperature, 
the amount of water and brewing period through a number of programmes adapted to each 
type of bean, and still not taking too much time. It took less than two minutes to get a really 
good coffee, while the comparable French drink took around ten minutes63. The 
acquirement was an incentive for media to dedicate more attention to Starbucks, the 
machines were being acclaimed: “now you can get perfect extraction”64 published in The 
New York Times; “ingenious” and “the coffee is so good people have no problem paying $6 
for a cup”65 was stated in The Economist. 
The coffee itself was also a point of improvement. The CEO proposed a new blend containing 
beans that, in his words, were “so fresh that *people who drink coffee with milk and sugar+ 
will want to drink it black”. The mix was named Pike Place, and its overall purpose was to 
provide a great coffee, with assured freshness and quality.  
The prices of specialty drinks increased, not only as a signal of the premium brand that 
Starbucks was, but also as a response to the overall rise in the costs of basic goods, due to 
the economic downturn. 
The other segment Howard Schultz wanted to pursue involved dealing with the willingness 
to pay of the price-sensitive end of the market. This segment was being served by some of 
the competitors and Starbucks didn’t want to lose the race. VIA was born in February 2009 
out of this line of attack. It was a premium instant coffee with a worldwide market of an 
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astonishing $21 billion66. The approach created controversy, “Starbucks may be waking up to 
reality and embracing its inner Walmart”67.  
It was first introduced in a number of chosen stores and it was a hit. People were adhering 
to the concept. It had sold $100 million in 10 months. Via would be sold not only in own 
stores, but also in REI, Compass, Office Depot, United Airlines, Barnes & Noble cafes, 
Marriott and Omni Hotels and later it was expected to get to mass grocery. Schultz’s 
ambition was to create “additional usage occasions” and it would be a great weapon 
internationally also, once outside America, 40% of the coffee consumption was instant 
coffee68 and for instance in Britain it was about 80%69. The CEO commented that VIA was a 
great innovation, and added that Starbucks could “integrate VIA into the emotional 
connection we have with our customers in our stores”70.  The price was significantly lower 
than any other product offered in their shops, as each coffee would cost less than $171. 
Another significant move towards a more mainstream segment was to push its Seattle’s Best 
Coffee brand into fast food chains, such as Burger King and Subway, into movie theatres, 
coffeehouses and supermarkets. This was a clear response to the low cost competitors, 
namely McDonalds and Dunkin’ Donuts, with Seattle’s Best Coffee having reached a total of 
30,000 locations in 2010. "Howard discovered, Wow, he's got this diamond in the rough of a 
brand that is part of the corporation, and we had not put the resources and the backing into 
it", said Michelle Gass, the president of Seattle’s Best Coffee. The plan for this brand’s future 
included its introduction at convenience stores, drive through kiosks and vending machines. 
Starbucks most recent change was the redesigning of the logo, in January 2011 (Exhibit 21). 
It was a tactic to expand the brand into new directions. By dropping the words “Starbucks 
Coffee”, it allowed them to better penetrate in new distribution channels, and with different 
kinds of products. Furthermore it was a sign of confidence, as Chris Allinson, the brand 
development project manager at the brand consultancy Added Value said “It shows that 
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The Path Ahead 
Starbucks had been succeeding in most of its initiatives. The stock was at $32.13 in 
December 2010, and the revenues were $10.7 billion, with 71% coming from its U.S. 
operations. The total amount of stores was 16,858, from which 5,724 were international 
stores, spread across 55 countries. The current CEO was fairly convinced the company had 
pursued the right strategy, he stated: “To completely press the pause button and stop 
growing the company at that point. We also had to close underperforming stores, and we 
had to understand that in addition to preserving the core values, this was not a time to 
embrace the status quo as an operating proposition”. To him, the price that customers paid 
was completely justified by brand differentiation, namely through the quality coffee the 
company provided, the health care they granted their employees and what they gave back 
to communities72. "Going forward, we will continue to focus on what made us a different 
kind of company, one that balances profitability and social conscience, while providing 
exceptional shareholder value", promised the CEO to all stakeholders.  
In the US market, Starbucks continued to search for more distribution channels, and will 
remain with a wide offer of food as complementary to its beverage business, as a means to 
continue to increase the average customer check73.  Innovation in the drinks had always 
been a must, and to prove they were committed to it, in March 2011 there were four new 
product lines launchings to celebrate the company 40th anniversary. Convenience was still a 
very important driver for purchase in 2010, as it accounted for 36% of the decision “where 
to drink coffee”. 
The most promising targets at this moment are the international markets, with emerging 
countries, namely China, India, Brazil and Russia gaining a special relevance due to their 
potential in terms of volume of customers. However, the growth will be faced with 
discipline, assured the CEO, ensuring that the company wasn’t going to get caught in the 
same trap. Adaptation to the culture was seen, by Starbucks, as crucial to a successful 
penetration into different countries, with a high degree of decentralization, trusting in the 
ones who really know the given market. 
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Regarding the segments targeted, attacking both a high end of the market and a more price-
sensitive portion might lead to some confusion in brand image. Nonetheless, so far it has 
proven to be very profitable to serve the mainstream customer.  
After 40 years doing business, Starbucks has undertaken some ups and downs, but has 
found its way around them, with Howard Schultz retaking a lead role. Under the attentive 
eyes of the analysts, the company has to manage to be profitable, maintaining a premium 
and responsible image. The big question that remains at this point is what does the future 
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Exhibits 
Exhibit 1: New Store Openings 1992-2000, with Howard Schultz as CEO  
Source: Starbucks Coffee Company Website, “Store Counts: Net Store Opening” 
 
Exhibit 2: International Store Openings 
Source: Starbucks Coffee Company Website, “Starbucks Company Timeline” 
  
Exhibit 3: Consolidated Revenues evolution   
Source: Starbucks Coffee Company Website, “Historical Revenue Summary” 
  Starbucks – The Growth Trap 
 27 




Source: Starbucks Coffee Company Website, “Store Counts: Net Store Opening” 
 
 




Source: Starbucks Coffee Company Website, “Store Counts: Net Store Opening” 
 
 
Exhibit 6: Global Market Research by Synovate, October 2006 
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Exhibit 7: Total Coffee Consumption by age and type, March 2008
 
 
Exhibit 8: McDonalds Coffee reach and revenues 
 
 
Source: McDonalds Annual reports. 
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Exhibit 9: Competitors comparison 
a) Performance comparison  
Note: brackets – international information 
 






Exhibit 10: Starbucks evolution comparing to its industry 
A) Stock price evolution from 2006 to 2011, comparing Starbucks (blue) with a sample of its competitors: Peet’s 
Coffee (red), Panera Bread (yellow), Dunkin’ Donuts (green), and Nasdaq Index (brown). 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance, 31/05/2011 
Note: Dunkin’ Donuts is transacted under the name of the parent company Allied Domecq (AED). This company core business is related to 
alcoholic beverages, and therefore is not a representative competitor for Starbucks quote. 
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B) “Starbucks total return to shareholders from September 28, 2003 to September 28, 2008, relative to the 
performance of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index, the NASDAQ Composite Index, and the Standard & Poor’s 500 
Consumer Discretionary Sector, a peer group that includes Starbucks. Indices shown in the graph have been 
reset to a base of 100 as of September 28, 2003, and assume an investment of $100 on that date and the 
reinvestment of dividends paid since that date. Starbucks has never paid a dividend on its common stock.  The 













Exhibit 11: GDP per capita evolution, United States 
Source: World Bank 
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Source: Starbucks Case Study, March 2009. Datamonitor 
 
 
Exhibit 14: Global Market Research by Synovate, October 2006  
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Source: Starbucks Coffee Company Website, Financial Releases 
 
 





 Source: Millares, Kristen, “Starbucks adjusts its formula in China; stores add food and room to chat for culture that doesn’t  take its coffee 
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Exhibit 19: Howard Schultz’s email to Jim Donald 
From: Howard Schultz  
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2007 10:39 AM Pacific Standard Time  
To: Jim Donald  
Cc: Anne Saunders; Dave Pace; Dorothy Kim; Gerry Lopez; Jim Alling; Ken Lombard; Martin Coles; 
Michael Casey; Michelle Gass; Paula Boggs; Sandra Taylor 
Subject: The Commoditization of the Starbucks Experience 
 
As you prepare for the FY 08 strategic planning process, I want to share some of my thoughts with 
you. 
Over the past ten years, in order to achieve the growth, development, and scale necessary to go 
from less than 1,000 stores to 13,000 stores and beyond, we have had to make a series of decisions 
that, in retrospect, have lead to the watering down of the Starbucks experience, and, what some 
might call the commoditization of our brand. 
Many of these decisions were probably right at the time, and on their own merit would not have 
created the dilution of the experience; but in this case, the sum is much greater and, unfortunately, 
much more damaging than the individual pieces. For example, when we went to automatic espresso 
machines, we solved a major problem in terms of speed of service and efficiency. At the same time, 
we overlooked the fact that we would remove much of the romance and theatre that was in play 
with the use of the La Marzocca machines. This specific decision became even more damaging when 
the height of the machines, which are now in thousands of stores, blocked the visual sight line the 
customer previously had to watch the drink being made, and for the intimate experience with the 
barista. This, coupled with the need for fresh roasted coffee in every North America city and every 
international market, moved us toward the decision and the need for flavor locked packaging. Again, 
the right decision at the right time, and once again I believe we overlooked the cause and the affect 
of flavor lock in our stores. We achieved fresh roasted bagged coffee, but at what cost? The loss of 
aroma -- perhaps the most powerful non-verbal signal we had in our stores; the loss of our people 
scooping fresh coffee from the bins and grinding it fresh in front of the customer, and once again 
stripping the store of tradition and our heritage? Then we moved to store design. Clearly we have 
had to streamline store design to gain efficiencies of scale and to make sure we had the ROI on sales 
to investment ratios that would satisfy the financial side of our business. However, one of the results 
has been stores that no longer have the soul of the past and reflect a chain of stores vs. the warm 
feeling of a neighborhood store. Some people even call our stores sterile, cookie cutter, no longer 
reflecting the passion our partners feel about our coffee. In fact, I am not sure people today even 
know we are roasting coffee. You certainly can't get the message from being in our stores. The 
merchandise, more art than science, is far removed from being the merchant that I believe we can 
be and certainly at a minimum should support the foundation of our coffee heritage. Some stores 
don't have coffee grinders, French presses from Bodum, or even coffee filters. 
Now that I have provided you with a list of some of the underlying issues that I believe we need to 
solve, let me say at the outset that we have all been part of these decisions. I take full responsibility 
myself, but we desperately need to look into the mirror and realize it's time to get back to the core 
and make the changes necessary to evoke the heritage, the tradition, and the passion that we all 
have for the true Starbucks experience. While the current state of affairs for the most part is self 
induced, that has lead to competitors of all kinds, small and large coffee companies, fast food 
operators, and mom and pops, to position themselves in a way that creates awareness, trial and 
loyalty of people who previously have been Starbucks customers. This must be eradicated. 
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I have said for 20 years that our success is not an entitlement and now it's proving to be a reality. 
Let's be smarter about how we are spending our time, money and resources. Let's get back to the 
core. Push for innovation and do the things necessary to once again differentiate Starbucks from all 
others. We source and buy the highest quality coffee. We have built the most trusted brand in coffee 
in the world, and we have an enormous responsibility to both the people who have come before us 
and the 150,000 partners and their families who are relying on our stewardship. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge all that you do for Starbucks. Without your passion and 
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IV. Teaching Note 
Synopsis 
Starbucks was founded in Seattle, in 1971, by Jerry Baldwin, Zev Ziegler and Gordon Bowker, 
but it was not until sixteen years later that it gained the image it has today. Howard Schultz 
was the one who, back in 1987, bought this company and gave it a unique concept; he 
wanted to create a social hub with high quality coffee and strong corporate and social 
responsibility, focusing mostly on the people. He came across this idea when, in a business 
trip to Milan, he saw himself in a city with small coffee shops everywhere, serving exquisite 
drinks, and also functioning as gathering locations. By that time, there was no such concept 
in America, nor high quality coffee, the market had much space to grow. It was a 
breakthrough that changed the way Americans flavoured their coffee and how much they 
were willing to pay for it.  
Starbucks came to create a market for specialty drinks and it expanded exponentially 
throughout decades, under the mandate of three CEOs, Howard Schultz, the founder; Orin 
Smith, a retail veteran; and Jim Donald, a Starbucks educated employee. It grew from six 
Seattle-based stores to a 17.000 giant, spread throughout the world. Along the way it 
changed from the “people’s front porch” original idea, to an efficiency and performance 
focused company, loosing much of its original identity.  
By 2008, Howard Schultz was forced to return to his former CEO position, in order to put 
Starbucks back on track. The company was dropping on market share value, as well as in 
sales per store. Across the world consumer preferences had changed, some of which 
Starbucks did not pay attention to, and the American economic downturn in 2008 came to 
restrict discretionary budgets. Also some low cost competitors entered in the market, 
namely McDonalds, which, given the customer’s limitations in spending and the number of 
stores it had, was affecting Starbucks. 
Schultz addressed the existing issues by first trying to understand the market and then 
formulating a strategy accordingly. To do this, he reorganized the executive team, keeping 
only two of the ten elements and replacing the rest, and conducted surveys to customers 
and employees, also known as partners. With the input of the workers, he was able to better 
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motivate them in order to create a tighter community, trying to avoid the usually high 
turnover. Adaptation to customer’s tastes and needs was a must and Starbucks did this 
through matching drinks and food to each place, but still maintaining some degree of 
standardization across the company. Also the design of each shop was rethought to create a 
better fit with the routine of the given clients. The coffee quality and the experience 
provided were also improved. International markets gained more and more importance to 
Starbucks due to their unexplored potential when it came to specialty coffee, by 2008 they 
accounted for almost 30% of the company revenue. 
This case examines how a company with such a success as Starbucks got lost on its own 
growth and failed to see what was really important, and later managed to overcome its 
obstacles with Howard Schultz’ help.  
The first section of the case is devoted to explaining the birth of Starbucks and the concept 
behind its success. It covers the early years of the company and the contribution Howard 
Schultz gave to the creation of the brand. 
The second part is related to Starbucks’ expansion, how it expanded under the mandates of 
the distinctive CEOs. It also denotes some of the market specificities along time that had 
impact on the growth, regarding America and also the rest of the globe, and finally the 
reaching of market saturation.  
The third chapter explains the rationale behind the growth, as well as its impact on the 
company. These effects should be evaluated having in mind the value proposition Starbucks 
committed to offer.  
The fourth section revolves around the return of Howard Schultz in 2008, and the measures 
he took to revive Starbucks’ soul and performance. It describes the path the CEO chose to 
increase the value offered to customers, starting by changing the executives, paying 
attention to employees and to the market. 
The last piece of the case describes the status of Starbucks in 2010, resuming the path the 
company went through and the challenges for the future. 
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Teaching Purpose 
Starbucks’ case is suited for students who have already undertaken basic Strategy and 
Management courses. It is to be taught in the undergraduate program or at Masters’ level, 
in strategy subjects, with the purpose to teach students another face of growth, adding to 
the effect that market changes can have in a very profitable company. 
The case requires students to:  
 Analyse the external context in the coffee market along time, highlighting the 
changes that were occurring. 
 Access what effects did the expansion have in the value proposition of Starbucks. 
 Examine how Schultz’s measures impacted Starbucks performance. 
 Understand how the strategic decisions taken impacted the resource base. 
The instructors should have already presented their students with the theory and a case 
dedicated to Dynamic Capabilities, so that they can better identify the shocks and 
dimensions in the Starbucks example. Compaq in Crisis by Adrian Elton is a good case to 
introduce the topic.  
 
Intended Contribution 
The Starbucks case illustrates first, how such a successful company that had been leading its 
industry for decades, is so vulnerable to market changes, namely consumer preferences and 
economic trends. It failed to be attentive to the environment, once the company was so 
distracted by its one growth. When not sensing market opportunities and threats, making 
timely and market oriented decisions, and changes in the resource base was very hard, 
having a negative impact on the company’s performance. Secondly it is also very useful to 
demonstrate how strategic decisions, in this case taken by Howard Schultz, can affect the 
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Instructor Preparation 
For the instructor to be better prepared, it would be useful to be informed about the 
dynamic capabilities’ view. For this purpose I suggest “Dynamic Capabilities: A Review of 
Past Research and an Agenda for the Future,” (Ilídio Barreto, Journal of Management, 
January 2010). Students should also have been exposed to this literature by the time they 
read the present case. 
Another important issue that should be covered by the instructor is the coffee market, and 
for that the report provided by Datamonitor “Global Hot Drinks – Industry Profile”, dated 
October 2008. It describes the industry worldwide at the point of the American economical 
downturn, this way being a great help for the understanding of the context. 
Datamonitor also has other relevant article regarding this case.  It’s the March 2009 
“Starbucks Case Study”. It helps the instructor to understand one of the most successful 
internationalization cases of Starbucks, the Japanese market. It is also very detailed 
regarding the ready to drink coffee, and its impact on the company. 
At last, the instructor can benefit from the McKinsey Quarterly article “Starbucks’ quest for 
healthy growth:  An interview with Howard Schultz”, issued in March 2011. It is a paper 
where the current CEO defined some of its strategies for the future that can help the 
instructor with the last section of the case. 
 
Suggested Assignment Questions 
Starbucks case first describes how such a successful and long lasting company failed to 
address market changes, and then describes how the firm was able to tackle most of the 
issues, taking decisions in line with the dimensions of the dynamic capabilities view. The 
instructor should cover the case with the following questions: 
 
1. Regarding the external environment, what can be highlighted in Starbucks path that 
led to Howard Schultz return? Is there any discontinuity in the market? 
With this question students should be able to identify two different periods: one, referring 
to when Starbucks got into the coffee market under Howard Schultz mandate; another, after 
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2006, leading to the CEO’s comeback in 2008, due to firm’s decreasing performance. It may 
also be possible to use a chronological approach.  
The student should be able to recognize that important market changes occurred. However, 
there is no abrupt discontinuity to be mentioned. The specialty coffee market can be seen as 
an environment that evolved in a significant but not dramatic way. 
 
The main aspects to highlight in the initial period are the following: 
 Coffee culture was undeveloped, meaning it had space to grow  
o Expansion of coffee market, “having experienced a 157% growth between 
2000 ($3,258m) and 2005 ($8,372m)” 
 Few substitutes or similar competitor since there was no matching concept in 
America 
 Premium coffee demand was increasing 
 Chains were appreciated 
 High quality suppliers used by Starbucks were not broadly used by competitors  
 Increasing income per capita 
 Trend towards social hubs supported by, for instance, the TV series Friends 
 International markets:  
o Markets in development; 
o Not Starbucks’ main focus.  
 
In the second period, the environmental characteristics that should be emphasized are: 
 Market saturation 
 Specialty market much more developed: many competitors, including low cost 
players 
 Specialty coffee demand rising 
 American population preference for small coffee shops 
 Subprime crisis creating budget restrictions: big impact on specialty goods 
 The atmosphere of a coffee shop was not a decisive factor for most Americans 
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 A growing “Ready to Drink” market 
 Aging demographics 
 International markets:  
o Increased market value and coffee addiction;  
o Chains preference over small shops;  
o American brand were highly regarded;  
o The atmosphere factor was valued;  
o Emergence of copycats. 
 
2. What did Starbucks offer that led to the wide adoption of the brand? How did the 
value proposition change over time? Please focus on the American market. 
First, the original value proposition offered by Starbucks should be emphasized:  
 Quality products: farmers were motivated to produce high quality beans due to the 
ethical relationship Starbucks created, rewarding them with fair prices and caring for 
sustainability. There was a large offer of customized, yet consistent drinks. High 
quality coffee was not usually available in coffee shops America. 
 Consumer Service: clients were served by baristas whose goal was to create a 
relationship. Customer preferences were always under the employees´ attentive eye. 
Baristas were rewarded above the market average, in order to make them satisfied 
and therefore creating a community spirit.  
 Atmosphere: the design of the shops was inviting, proving the “people’s front porch”. 
 
Second, the student should devote time to explain the evolution of the above-mentioned 
proposition.  
 Quality products:  
o Pro: increased diversity of drinks. 
o Cons: attention deviated from the coffee with the introduction of so many 
dispersed products. 
 Consumer Service:  
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o Pro: introduction of prepaid card simplifying transactions. 
o Cons: baristas could no longer be attentive to customer preferences; focus on 
efficiency. 
 Atmosphere:  
o Cons: Standardization of design.  
 
3. In what way did Starbucks fail, leading to the decrease in performance? Please 
consider the dynamic capabilities view in your analysis. 
It is important that the student understands that more than one variable contributed for the 
decrease in Starbucks’ performance. First, the answer should have explicit that the economic 
downturn was not the cause for the tumble. In 2006, Starbucks started displaying evidences 
of problems, well before the economic crisis took place. Moreover, many competitors did 
not have the same negative impact on performance, confirming the fact that the economic 
downturn was not the problem or else it would have affected the entire industry. 
It is also relevant to note that Starbucks struggled mainly in the American market, while the 
international market was thriving. 
The real issue that affected this company was its lack of perception of the evolution of the 
market (consumer trends mostly) and, in consequence, there was a lack of timely and 
market-oriented decisions. In result, they also did not change their resources to better fit the 
market. Starbucks was inebriated by its growth, everything seemed to work, wherever and 
whenever they opened a store. 
It is clear that the sensing of opportunities was relatively low in this period. First, Starbucks 
failed to sense the changing consumer preferences evolving towards familiar shops, with 
differentiated features and a community sense, and went in the opposite direction. Then, 
the firm did not understand the market need for a quality service, and took counter market-
oriented decisions, based on the stock price. Furthermore, the retailer did not realize the 
demographic shock or the implications that the mortgage crisis would have. Another 
important change that Starbucks failed to sense was the increasing potential of international 
markets, namely emergent countries. 
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The propensity to make timely decisions was also low. Starbucks did not make the decisions 
ahead of competitors, instead it reacted when negative effects were visible. The firm was 
not capable of sensing the changes in the market, so it could not have a quick response to 
them.  
Starbucks propensity to make market oriented decisions was also at a low level. This 
dimension was negatively affected by the lack of market sense. Considering that the firm 
was not aware of market changes, it could not make decisions in response to those changes. 
The lack of market consciousness led Starbucks to make several counter market-oriented 
decisions, namely the standardization of stores, the focus on efficiency rather than on the 
customers, among others. 
The propensity to change the resource base was jeopardized by the low levels scored on the 
other dimensions, and, in consequence, was also low. As the company did not understand 
the importance of the customer experience, it did not bet on employees’ know how, 
motivation or loyalty either. Instead, it adopted such big automated machines that 
diminished the relationship between baristas and clients by diminishing the eye contact and 
did not allow the usage of the coffee-making skills of the employees. 
Starbucks showed a low level of dynamic capabilities at this point and it was not achieving 






4. What strategic decisions did Howard Schultz make regarding the dynamic 
capabilities’ dimensions? How did they contribute to an improved performance? 
The present question requires the student to identify what decisions the CEO made, while 
connecting them to the dynamic capabilities’ dimensions. The first fact to denote is that 
there were two distinctive markets, the North American and the International one, and each 
of them asked for different adaptations within the same overall strategy. 
Sensing opportunities and threats: Low 
Making timely decisions: Low 
Making market-oriented decisions: Low 
Changing resource base: Low 
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Howard Schultz’s first decision was to go back to the core, focus on people, adapt Starbucks 
to customers and increase visibility. From this point on, the CEO was committed to adopt a 
disciplined growth. The American market required more attention since it was where the 
performance had decreased the most. International markets were not so affected due to the 
fact that preferences prevailing there were different, and furthermore, American brands 
tend to have foreign fans just because of their country of origin.  
Most decisions made after Schultz’s comeback can be viewed along the dynamic capabilities’ 
dimensions. The sense opportunities and threats was confirmed by the following: 
o Sense the huge market for instant coffee - VIA 
o Increase of people drinking coffee at home – investment in the availability of 
Starbucks products in groceries and other channels 
o Sense the threat of McDonalds increasing its coffee network – push Seattle’s 
Best Coffee into chains 
o Implement consumer surveys + online forum: allow sensing opportunities in 
the future 
Regarding the propensity to make timely decisions, Starbucks did not take most of the 
decisions in a timely manner until this point. They were a reaction to the decrease in 
performance, not anticipation because they were not attentive to market 
opportunities/threats. However, with the new systems Howard Schultz was implementing, 
the company had, at this point, a structure that allowed acting quickly according to changes. 
The propensity to make market-oriented decisions was visible in the company and could be 
seen in several situations: 
o Adapt drinks and design locally – enabled by the customer surveys  
o Implement customer suggested measures - Internet forum 
o Introduce VIA – response to a need in the market 
o Increase distributions channels (groceries…) – response to a growing demand 
o International markets: keep Starbucks brand visible VS American local 
adaptation: “15th Ave. Coffee & Tea” 
o Increase visibility of social initiatives: diminish critics of the market and create 
a community 
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There also many evidences of changes in the resource base after 2008: 
o Comeback of Schultz to the former CEO position  
o Reduce in the number of stores - extend the survival of the company, while 
doing the required changes  
o Reorganize executives – create and implement the strategy 
o Train baristas – provide better service, motivation, know how 
o Improve baristas satisfaction to decrease turnover – create community sense 
o Acquire Coffee Equipment Company - provide better coffee quality 
o Introduce Seattle Best Coffee brand in low costs chains  
o Redesign logo 







The company suffered many alterations, which enabled Starbucks to better face changes in 
the market, through adaptation. With these measures, the retailer improved its 
performance, fact that the instructor can demonstrate with a simple stock price evolution 
chart.  
 
5. (Optional Question) What is your opinion regarding Howard Schultz strategic decision 
of targeting both higher and lower end of the market? Guidelines: 
One interesting question that could arise in class is related with Starbucks strategy to target 
both high and low ends of the market. The instructor could address this matter by 
highlighting the dilemma between benefits and issue of pursuing such approach. 
Sensing opportunities and threats: Medium/ High 
Making timely decisions: Medium 
Making market-oriented decisions: Medium/ High 
Changing resource base: High 
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As benefits the instructor could mention the expansion of market reach, with the lower-end 
having a great potential in terms of volume. There’s also little overlap of the two segments, 
since one wants the quality experience while the other just wants a quick coffee. 
The most significant issues related with this strategy is the confusion in the brand image. The 
premium quality standard Starbucks offered, was what led people to be willing to pay for 
such high margins, and it could be damaged by targeting the mainstream segment. 
 
Teaching Plan 
The Starbucks teaching case is prepared for a 90 minutes class, given that the students are 
already familiarized with the dynamic capabilities’ view, and have examined the case. The 
suggestion below doesn’t include the optional question, if the instructor chooses to present 
it, the plan must be adapted to it.  
 
10 min 
•Review Dynamic Capabilities view 
15 min 
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V. Discussion 
The following discussion is intended to relate the dynamic capabilities view to the Starbucks 
case. First, it is noteworthy to recall the definition proposed by Barreto (2010), since it is the 
most consistent one and summarizes the main elements mentioned in the previously 
proposed definitions: “A dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to systematically solve 
problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and 
market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base.” 
Success is a hard achievement, and the key to get it is still somewhat of a mystery. Michael 
Porter’s industrial organization model did not hold as a sufficient explanation. Giving 
emphasis to the external context is important, but research has suggested it is not enough to 
be successful (Adner and Helfat, 2003). The Starbucks’ case seems to support these findings: 
the company entered the coffee market in a period in which the industry was experiencing 
an overall decline in sales, making its attractiveness doubtful; nonetheless, the retailer was 
able to create its own demand and enjoy a huge success for many years.  
It was a firm specificity that led to such a good performance. The RBV theory could nicely 
explain the initial period of Starbucks, but it would fail to explain why did Starbucks’ 
performance decrease after 2006 and improve latter on. In dynamic markets that undergo 
consecutive shocks, firms are required to adapt. The failure to anticipate and adapt to 
several changes led to Starbucks’ tumble.  
In contrast with other theories, the dynamic capabilities view explicitly contemplates 
changes in the environment and the ability to adapt to them, through its four dimensions 
(Barreto, 2010). These dimensions need to coexist in a company at a sufficiently high level, in 
order to enable firm’s adaptation.  
Under this view it is possible to offer a better explanation for the history of a company such 
as Starbucks. As markets are very competitive and constantly changing, the “potential to 
systematically solve problems” is crucial to keep up with the setting. However, dynamic 
capabilities are not only helpful in highly dynamic environments, it has been suggested that 
they can also be important in moderately dynamic contexts, as argued by Eisenhardt and 
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Martin (2000). Paying attention to all four elements of the dynamic capabilities’ definition is 
essential, as well as the interdependence among them (Teece, 2007; Pablo et al., 2007).    
The propensity to sense market opportunities and threats, also known as monitoring 
capability (Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl, 2007), has been considered key to the dynamic 
capabilities view, as it is the dimension that allows spotting the market changes. Gilbert 
(2006) added that capabilities could suit the internal context of a company, while not fitting 
the environment. Another important issue about the dynamic capabilities’ dimensions is 
that they are somewhat dependent on each other (Barreto, 2010). Starbucks case illustrates 
quite well the relevance of the propensity to sense market opportunities and threats, as well 
as the relations that can exist between dimensions.  
First, it was the sensing of a market opportunity that led Howard Schultz to buy Starbucks, 
and implement his concept of a social hub with quality coffee. This enabled him to enjoy a 
major success for many decades. However, at a second stage, Starbucks was so inebriated by 
its success and growth that it stopped being attentive to the market. This issue was 
especially noticeable in the American market. Everything the company was doing seemed to 
have worked, so they just kept doing it, and did not monitor the market changes. The 
retailer did not see the consumer preferences evolution, or the demographic change, or 
even the severity of the economic downturn. The firm fell in a trap and lost its way.  
Adding to this, the low level of propensity to sense opportunities and threats had a negative 
effect on the other dimensions. Since Starbucks did not see the changes in the market, it did 
not have the tools to make decisions ahead of competitors, neither to make decisions that 
fitted the market. In consequence, the resource base was not properly adapted to respond 
to changes. The first dimension undermined all the others, and it functioned as a cascade, 
leading to a low level of dynamic capabilities. Starbucks did not make an effort to build 
consecutive competitive advantages by adapting to market changes. It was blind by the 
success it had been experiencing. 
With Schultz’s comeback, Starbucks installed mechanisms that allowed them to sense 
market opportunities and threats, such as the online forum and the customer surveys. The 
management team was also more focused on the market characteristics, rather than on 
growth. All of these changes had a very positive impact on the company’s performance. 
Furthermore, a higher level on this dimension enabled higher degrees on the others. 
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The propensity to make timely decisions has been discussed since the appearance of the 
dynamic capabilities’ view. Teece et al. (1997) mentioned this element by expressing the 
need to act “quickly”, and later, Adner and Helfat (2003) had referred that timing was as 
important as the content of the decision. The Starbucks case helps to illustrate the 
importance of timely decision making. Its handicap on market sensing in the first period 
diminished its capability of making decisions in a timely manner. During the high growth 
period, under the mandates of Orin Smith and Jim Donald, Starbucks was not making fast 
decisions, it just reacted and did not anticipate changes. The retailer simply put the market-
oriented decisions on hold until the moment Howard Schultz retuned. For instance, it only 
started moving away from the standardization with Schultz, several years after the 
preference for familiar environments had emerged. When Schultz’s returned, he tried to 
create mechanisms to better understand the market, and consequently it was expectable 
that timely decisions would be facilitated.  
The third dimension in the definition, the propensity to make market-oriented decisions is 
crucial to achieve a successful market adaptation.  The content together with the right 
timing (Adner and Helfat, 2003) helps providing value to the customers and keeping ahead 
of competition. The propensity to sense opportunities/threats has a strong influence in the 
decision making process (making market oriented decisions). The latter was found to be only 
relevant if the former was satisfied (Gilbert, 2006). Additional insights can be provided by 
the Starbucks case regarding this matter. The lack of market sensing led to poor decisions in 
the period that ended with Schultz’s comeback. Consumer preferences evolved and 
Starbucks was not on top of it. American customers were willing to pay for a Starbucks 
product due to the experience they got and not only for the product. Whereas the market 
asked for differentiation, Starbucks started to bet on efficiency, and this was only one of the 
many counter market-oriented decisions the company made. After 2008, the CEO tried to 
tackle this issue, first by creating the base for sensing opportunities and threats and then to 
act accordingly to the market. He decided to adapt products and the design to meet market 
requests and also invested in the community sense to enhance the experience. He launched 
the VIA instant coffee to get advantage of the huge market potential, expanded distribution 
channels to respond to the increasing home coffee consumption, and focused his attention 
on the very promising international activities.  
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The propensity to change the resource base is the last dimension in the dynamic capabilities’ 
definition, but it is the final crucial step to achieve market adaptation. It has been mentioned 
by other authors (e.g. Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007), and it contemplates 
the creation, extension and reconfiguration (Teece et al., 1997) of firm resources to fit the 
strategic decisions. Management teams have an essential role on making the decisions and 
therefore enabling the resource base change (Pablo et al., 2007). Also, higher levels of the 
previous three dimensions will positively affect the degree of change in resource (Menguc 
and Auh, 2006). The Starbucks case demonstrates clearly the impact of the quality of the 
first three dimensions in the last one. During its astonishing growth phase Starbucks could 
not correctly adapt the resource base accordingly to timely and market-oriented decisions 
because it did not sensed what was happening in the market. The executive team was 
chosen on its experience to create growth, and not on the capacity to improve customer 
service. Everything was adapted to fit growth.  
Howard Schultz was able to address most of the dimensions proposed in the dynamic 
capabilities definition after his comeback, and then, the company was able to accomplish a 
higher level at the dimensions. The management team, with Schultz heading it, made a huge 
difference. Growth was no longer the priority, serving the market became fundamental. By 
making an effort to sense opportunities and threats and installing systems that allowed 
continuing to do so, they were able to make market oriented and timely decisions, as well as 
adapting the resources to the strategic decisions. They adapted the company resources in 
order to improve the experience provided to customers, and dealt with several key areas 
such: as executives aligned with the company strategy; employees’ know how through 
training; motivation with engagement initiatives; loyalty through the reward program with 
the prepaid card; acquisitions to improve the quality of the product, among other 
adaptations.  
Thus, Starbucks quest for success is intimately connected with the dynamic capabilities’ 
view. Its ups and downs can be explained with respectively higher and lower levels of the 
dimensions of this view.  
 The dynamic capabilities’ view has implicit the existence of a shock, which is commonly 
known as an abrupt change in the market. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) have stated that 
having dynamic capabilities is beneficial in any kind of market dynamism, meaning that 
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implementing dynamic capabilities does not require high-velocity market with abrupt 
changes. Moderately dynamic environments, with somewhat predictable paths also benefit 
from this view, but here the dynamic capabilities resemble routines, that begin with the 
analysis of the market and end with its implementation (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
Starbucks path is a good evidence of company inserted in an industry that, although 
changing, there is no abrupt shock, and still there is a need for dynamic capabilities. The 
gradual changes in consumer preferences that went unnoticed affected negatively 
Starbucks’ performance and the demographic change also took a toll in their performance. 
The most visible shock was the economic downturn in 2008, however it was not responsible 
for the decrease in performance that Starbucks went through, since this fall was already 
visible in 2006 stock price, but it certainly did not assist the retailer in its quest for success. In 
the moment that Schultz restored good levels in all the dynamic capabilities’ dimensions, the 
company improved the performance. 
In sum, it is important to understand the importance of each of the dimensions in the 
dynamic capabilities view and how they relate, as well as the usefulness of the vision in any 
firm and market. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Dynamic capabilities view has been suggested as an important theoretical explanation for 
companies’ success in turbulent environments. It has been widely used in the literature, but 
more research seems required in order to build a more consistent theory. 
Barreto (2010) has put forward a new and improved definition as well as a review of the past 
literature. This dissertation was built around such a conceptualization.  
Starbucks case illustrates how important having dynamic capabilities can be, even for well 
established firms. The company enjoyed such a success, and expanded so much, with 
everything always working out, that they forgot to continue to be attentive and adapt to the 
market and just kept doing the same. With few capabilities towards sensing the changes in 
the external context, Starbucks had no structure to develop the other three dimensions, and 
this had a strongly negative impact on its performance.  
Howard Schultz was forced to return to his former CEO position and corrected these issues, 
providing the company with stronger dynamic capabilities, especially by implementing 
systems that allowed Starbuck to be on top of market evolution, to which it would adapt. In 
the future, the quest for Starbucks will be to maintain a strong brand image, grow with 
discipline and continue to build consecutive competitive advantages. 
The aim of this thesis was to illustrate the dynamic capabilities view with a real life case, 
providing additional evidence for the importance of this novel theory to the business world. I 
concluded not only that dynamic capabilities seem relevant but also that its four dimensions 
seem crucial for firms’ adaptation to changing environments. 
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